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Abstract:  This paper estimates the impact of risk aversion on the farm household’s choice of crop
mix  using the ICRISAT panel.  To the extent that production risk is uninsured and households
are risk averse, the choice of crop mix will deviate from the expected profit maximizing choice. 
The paper finds that farmer choices of crop mix are affected by weather risk in two of the
ICRISAT villages considered here.  Since poorer households are less able to smooth consumption
ex post, their ex ante choices are further from the expected profit maximizing crop mix.  Empirical
results support the model of crop choice.  Moreover,  poorer households allocate land to a mix of
crops with lower risk (and  lower average profits),  as predicted by the model.  This likely
contributes to the rise in inequality in the villages over the study period. 
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Michael Wohlgenant and workshop participants at North Carolina State University for useful
comments.  All remaining errors are mine alone.I.  Introduction
The impact of risk on farm resource allocation in many low-income rural areas is widely
recognized.  In the absence of complete markets for insuring ex ante against adverse shocks to
household income, or for adequate mechanisms for ex-post consumption smoothing, households
are likely to adjust their allocation of household assets (Rosenzweig and Binswanger) and their
allocation of household labor between work on-farm and labor supplied in the rural spot labor
market (Rose).  For many low-income rural households, however, their most important source of
income is farm production, and crop production dominates agricultural returns for most of these
households in the semi-arid tropics considered below.  
An important decision of farm cultivators  is the allocation of land under cultivation across
different crops.  Land accounts for a dominant share of the total asset base (Walker and Ryan, p.
70).  Moreover, crops differ widely in terms of  yield variability arising from fluctuations in rainfall
or other weather variables.  If rural households choose less risky crop mixes in order to mitigate
against weather uncertainty ex ante, then average farm profits will be smaller, and consumption
and welfare accordingly will be lower than would be the case with risk-neutral decision makers. 
Moreover, the effects of risk likely exacerbates inequality in rural areas, since wealthier
households have better access to ex post mechanisms for consumption smoothing than poor
households and thus are less likely to choose crop mixes with lower average returns as a hedge
against production risk.
The impact of risk on the portfolio of crops by rural households may be an important
factor contributing to lower incomes and greater inequality.  Moreover, if risk leads rural
households to pursue crop portfolios that deviate from the expected profit maximizing choices,
straightforward mechanisms for smoothing consumption ex-post may have the added benefit of2
raising average profits from crop production in low-income rural areas.
In fact, the two villages studied here are characterized by a substantial degree of wealth
inequality (Table 1).  For example, the Gini coefficient for wealth holdings in all the villages was
close to 0.5 or greater in 1975.  Moreover, inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient appears
to have increased substantially during the period covered by the data.  By 1983, the Gini
coefficient had risen from 0.51 to 0.59 in Aurepalle and from 0.53 to 0.65 in Kanzara.  
Coefficients of skewness for the villages also indicate a dramatic rise in the skewness of the
wealth distribution between 1975 and 1983.
This paper uses data from a sample of rural Indian households collected by the
International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) to examine the
impact of weather risk on the allocation of land across crops with different degrees of
susceptibility to weather-related risk.  The semi-arid tropics are characterized by a high degree of
weather uncertainty, particularly with respect to the timing and conditions of the monsoon, which
have significant impacts on crop yields.  Previous research has documented the importance of
weather uncertainty in affecting the allocation of household asset portfolios (Rosenzweig and
Binswanger) and the allocation of household labor between on-farm and off-farm production in
the case of India (Kochar, Rose).  The ICRISAT data contains detailed information on the timing
and extent of the monsoon at the village level, allowing for estimation of the impact of weather
uncertainty on crop choice.
The structure of the paper is as follows.  The second section describes production in the
ICRISAT villages, discusses why risk may affect crop choice, and describes the rising inequality in
ICRISAT villages during the study period. The third section lays out a theoretical model of crop3
choice in which crops exhibit varying degrees of susceptibility to risk.   The fourth section
discusses empirical results, which suggest that farmer risk aversion influences crop choice
substantially in two of the villages. Section V demonstrates that wealthier farmers choose crop
mixes characterized by greater profit variance (and higher average profits), which may contribute
to greater inequality over time.  Section VI concludes. 
II.  Agricultural Production in the Semi-arid Tropics and the ICRISAT Data
In this paper I use a well-known dataset collected by the International Crop Research
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) to study how crop mix is affected by weather
uncertainty.   Data were collected from forty farmers, thirty of whom were cultivators, in ten
different Indian villages representing three distinct regions of India's SAT over the period 1975 to
1984.  Data are available from three of the study villages for ten years; three other villages have
data available for only six years; data on the other four villages are available for four years.  I
focus here on two of the original six study villages for which the full time series of data is
available. 
Agricultural production in the semi-arid tropics is characterized by two main growing
seasons. The rainy (kharif) season begins with the onset of the monsoon when soils are water-rich
and germination is easy.  The post-rainy (rabi) season begins after the monsoon, drawing on
moisture stored in the soil after rainy-season crops have been grown.  Of the three main ICRISAT
study villages for which the longer time series on rainfall is available, kharif-season production
dominates in Aurepalle and Kanzara.  Kharif production accounted for roughly three-fourths of
total area under production in 1983 in Aurepalle and for about 90 percent of total area under4
1Based on author’s calculations from ICRISAT data.
production in Kanzara.
1  In contrast, rabi production dominates in the Sholapur villages of
Shirapur and Kalman, where kharif crops account for only one-third of area farmed.  In these
villages, the deep clay soils allow for greater storage of moisture, allowing farmers to cultivate
when there is far less uncertainty about crop yields (Walker and Ryan, p.34).
In fact, the kharif season is characterized by a high-degree of uncertainty concerning crop
yields and income from crop production when planting takes place.  While field preparation for
kharif-season production takes place before the onset of the monsoon, most planting activities are
triggered with the beginning of rainfall in June or early July.  As the monsoon unfolds, planting
(and transplanting) occur, fertilizer is applied, fields are weeded, and other production tasks are
completed.   Farmers must invest considerable resources in planting-season tasks, including
purchases of  fertilizer and seeds, before the realization of yields or prices is clear.  Aurepalle is 
most susceptible to weather risk, since planting there must begin on a tighter schedule.   Aurepalle
also exhibits far greater rainfall variability than Kanzara, and is drought prone (Walker and Ryan,
p.36). 
Weather is a major source of the uncertainty surrounding the returns to crop production in
villages dominated by kharif-season cropping, and can be easily summarized by the timing and
amount of monsoon rainfall.  Crop yields are highly susceptible to variations in the timing and
duration of the monsoon.  Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) found that household profits from
crop production are correlated with the monsoon onset date.  A model in which weather risk
conditions the allocation of land under production to different crops may describe the nature of
kharif production, but certainly is less applicable to rabi production.  Since rainfall uncertainty is5
largely resolved before rabi production tasks occur, risk aversion should play a smaller role in
crop choices.  Therefore, I concentrate here on Aurepalle and Kanzara the two villages dominated
by kharif production.
Cropping patterns in the ICRISAT villages are complex and characterized by a
considerable degree of heterogeneity in crop choice across households within a village and even
more so across villages.   Table 2 summarizes cropping patterns in Aurepalle and Kanzara at the
beginning and end of the study period, e.g. in 1975 and in 1983.   The villages were characterized
by substantial increases between 1975 and 1983 in the share of total farmland allocated to high-
yielding varieties of crops.
In Aurepalle, crop production is dominated by production of traditional sorghum and
castor. In 1975 traditional sorghum accounted for about 40 percent of total acres cropped in the
village.  By 1983 that percentage had fallen to 25.  Some of these acres likely went into
production of high-yielding varieties of castor, which rose substantially from 1975 to 1983.  At
the beginning of the sample modern varieties of castor were essentially not grown; by 1983 they
accounted for 38 percent of the acres in Aurepalle.   Traditional castor varieties fell from 29
percent to 4 percent during the same time frame.
In Kanzara the dominant crop is cotton, which accounted for more than half total acreage
in the sample during most of  the study period.  Sorghum also accounted for roughly 1/5 of
acreage in Kanzara at the beginning of the study, with a shift to HYV sorghum by the mid 1980s. 
Pulses are much less important in Kanzara than in Aurepalle.  
III.  A Model of Crop Choice
Consider a farm household with a fixed holding of crop land L which is allocated at the6
2If farm size is endogenous within the crop year, of course, the analysis would be much more
complicated.  Ignoring decisions concerning inter-cropping and double-cropping, however, it
seems reasonable to treat farm size as fixed within crop year t.  This is particularly so in the semi-
arid tropics where land sales are rare and land rental contracts are likely to be negotiated in
advance of planting.
3For a discussion of conditions under which the assumption of mean-variance utility function is
reasonable, see Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993.
1￿ ￿ L +(.i) 1￿ (2)
µ￿ ￿ Lg ( .i)µ ￿ (1)
beginning of the crop year, before the realization of weather uncertainty to production of n
different crops, where .i is the share of total crop land allocated to the ith crop.
2  The farmer
allocates land holdings to maximize utility of consumption.  I assume that the farmer’s preferences
may be summarized by a standard mean-variance utility function V(µc,1c) where µc is expected
consumption and 1c is the standard-deviation of consumption.
3  The farmer maximizes V(µc,1c),
where Vµ >0 and V1<0.  Meyer shows that the quasiconcavity of V(￿) is sufficient to guarantee
convexity of preferences, so I assume Vµµ < 0, V11 <0, and  Vµµ V11 -  Vµ1
2 > 0.  The farmer can
affect the mean and variance of income by choice of crop mix.  If {µ￿,1￿} is the mean and
standard deviation of profits from crop production and {µ￿,1￿} is the mean and standard deviation
of the random weather shock, we can write:
where L is total land farmed, and constant returns to scale is assumed.  The functions +(T) and g(T)
map the distribution of the weather shock ￿ into the distribution of crop income.
Ignoring other sources of income, the relationship between expected consumption and7
1c ￿ ￿(W) 1￿ (3)
Vµ g.i ￿ V1 +.i 1￿ ￿,i ￿1,2,...n   (4)
expected profits is straightforward:  µc = µ￿ .  The relationship between the standard deviation in
crop profits and the standard deviation in consumption depends on whether farmers have
mechanisms available  for ex-post consumption smoothing, which could arise from either capital
markets (asset sales, as in Rosenzweig and Wolpin), inter-household transfers arising from
marriage relationships (Rosenzweig and Stark) or off-farm labor market opportunities (Rose). 
Farm risk studies such as Just and Pope, and Antle (1987, 1989), assume that 1c = 1￿ , while other
studies assume perfect ex-post consumption smoothing, e.g. 1c  = 0 (Paxson).  As Rosenzweig
and Binswanger assert, the truth is likely somewhere in the middle, with the degree to which
farmers are able to smooth consumption ex post related to wealth levels, W, e.g.
Substituting (1) through (3) into the utility function V(￿), a set of first order conditions for
optimal crop choice may be derived as :
If farmers are risk averse (V1 g0) and crops differ in their contribution to profit variability,
( ), as long as consumption is not perfectly insured against fluctuations in crop-profits (￿ g +.ig0
0) then average profits will be lower than average profits would be with expected profit
maximization, which is defined implicitly by  .  g.i ￿ 0
The first-order conditions in (4) imply several testable hypotheses about the choice of crop
mix.  First, there should be a positive correlation between a crop’s contribution to expected
profits and its contribution to profit variability:8









￿k.kit￿t ￿ ￿￿￿t ￿ 0it  (6)
Moreover, the allocation of land across crops will differ from the allocation that would prevail
under expected profit maximization.  Crops which have higher expected returns (and thus greater
variance in returns) will be under-represented, while those with lower expected returns will be
over-represented, compared with the expected- profit-maximizing allocation.  The effect of a
mean-preserving spread in the standard deviation of the weather shock is to lower the riskiness of
the farmer’s crop mix + and expected profits.  But the effect of such an increase in risk will
decline with total wealth if either there is declining relative and absolute risk aversion or if
(Rosenzweig and Binswanger).    Farmers more capable of bearing risk will then also 0￿/0W<0
choose crop mixes with higher variance in profits as well as higher average profits from crop
production.
IV.  Model and Empirical Results
In order to test the relevance of the risk model of crop-choice outlined above, I consider a 
regression of profits against measures of crop share and rainfall uncertainty.  I utilize a normalized
quadratic form of the profit function, conditional on the household’s allocation choices and on
weather uncertainty, ￿, for estimation:
where .kit  refers to the share of crop k in farmer I’s crop mix in period t; ￿t is the (village-specific)
weather shock to production in year t; and 0it is the household-time specific error term in the9
4Binswanger and Rosenzweig tested for the significance of several other rainfall variables.  They
found that the monsoon end date, the average rain per day during the monsoon, and two periods
of drought were not statistically significant in determining crop profits in the sample of 10
ICRISAT villages.  The frequency of rainfall days during the monsoon was only marginally
significant.
regression (discussed below).  Parameters to be estimated are given by {￿,/,￿}.  Parameters are
assumed to be constant across time and households and to reflect only technology.  The
appropriate measure of weather uncertainty must of course be formalized in order to study the
impact of weather uncertainty on household profits.  I follow Binswanger and Rosenzweig in
using as a measure of rainfall variability the date of the monsoon onset,
determined as the date after which there has been at least 20 mm of rain after June 1. 
4
The appropriateness of the model depends on the assumption that all land allocation
decisions are made before the weather shock is realized.  While this assumption may well be
subject to question, the ability of farmers to switch crop choices after the production year begins
is certainly constrained in several ways.  First, seeds and other variable inputs must be purchased
(or withheld from last year’s production, if they are traditional varieties) in advance.  Moreover,
soil preparation differs from crop to crop.  Other inputs provided outside the household’s own
resources likely must be contracted for in advance.  Moreover, variable inputs should be allocated
in fixed proportion to the land allocation decision and farmers should maximize profits conditional
on the land allocation decision and on the realization of weather uncertainty after land allocations
have been decided.
  One advantage of the generalized quadratic profit function is that it allows us to recover
easily the ex-ante riskiness of each households choice of crop mix.  The riskiness of each
household’s land allocation choice, +i, based on (2) and (6) is given by:10
5Since there are fewer than forty households per village, using village level random effects is not
possible in these regressions.  There are not enough observations to obtain the “between”





  The appropriate statistical model for estimation of {￿,/,￿}in equation (6) depends on the
nature of the error term 0it, especially its relationship to the variables included in the regression.  If
the 0it are correlated with crop mix, then the appropriate estimation technique is household level
fixed effects, e.g. fixed effects will give unbiased estimates of the model parameters.  On the other
hand, if the 0it  are not correlated with other variables included in the model, then using a pooled
regression will yield more efficient (e.g. lower standard error) parameter estimates.  The
appropriateness of fixed versus random effects is tested below.
5
I utilize the detailed production data available in the ICRISAT panel to construct measures
of profits from crop production at the household level.  Profits from crop production are the
difference between the value of all crops grown valued at the village-specific price (whether
consumed on-farm or sold) and the opportunity cost of all inputs, where family labor is valued at
the village- and gender-specific market wage. 
I begin by estimating the normalized profit function using the generalized quadratic form
defined in (6).  In addition to information on the share of total crop land allocated to each crop
and the weather shock, I included total area farmed in order to test for scale effects in the profit
regressions.  Summary characteristics of household profit regressions at the village level are
reported in Table 3 for the two villages.  I tested for the presence of fixed effects using the
Hausman test and could not reject a null hypothesis of no fixed effects for either village. 11
Therefore, I report results based on pooled regressions; the standard errors are corrected for
possible effects of village level clustering which would otherwise cause the estimated standard
errors to be biased downward (Moulton).    
The model did a somewhat better job of capturing variation in household profits for
Aurepalle (column 1), and the R-squared was 0.70.  An F-test for significance of the weather
terms was significant at less than the one percent level, indicating that the monsoon onset date is
important in determining household profits.  A test for the joint significance of the share
interaction terms in (6), e.g. for the /ij where Igj,  suggested that the share interactions are
statistically significant at the one percent level.  The coefficient on total area farmed was not
statistically significant, indicating that scale effects are mild in Aurepalle.   Since the availability of
irrigation is likely to be important in determining cropping patterns, I included the share of
irrigated land held by the household in the regressions as well.  The coefficient was not
statistically significant at even the 10 percent level.  
Estimation results for Kanzara are reported in column 2 of Table 3.  The R-squared in the
regression was only 0.39, indicating a somewhat weaker fit to the data.  The t-statistic on total
area farmed was not significant, indicating no evidence of scale effects in crop production.  
Variables measuring the effect of  monsoon onset were jointly significant at the one percent level,
as were the variables on the  share interaction terms, /ij .
An important result of the model of crop choice here is a positive correlation between the
effect of a crop on mean profits and its effect on the riskiness of farm profits (profit variance), as
given in equation (5) above.   Tables 4 and 5 give estimates of the effects of different crops on
mean profit and profit-variance in the villages.   In each case, results are reported relative to the12
mean and risk effects of vegetable crops, to allow for easier interpretation.   Results for Aurepalle
conform well with the predictions of the model from equation (5).  For most of the crops, the
relationship between the effect of average profits and the effect on the profit variance has the
same sign.  Moreover, the simple correlation coefficient between the measures in column (1) and
column (3) is 0.86.   Production of HYV paddy is associated with sharply higher average profits
per acre, and with a higher variance in total profits as well.  Traditional castor and traditional
paddy, as well as HYV paddy are all associated with lower average profits.  Traditional sorghum,
which accounts for 38 percent of total cropland is associated with higher average profits, but a
lower profit variance, at odds with the prediction of the model.  Results for Kanzara, Table 5, also
conform well with the predictions of the model.  The correlation between profit mean and
variance effects is 0.60 in Kanzara, somewhat weaker than for Aurepalle.  HYV varieties of
cotton are associated with sharply higher average profits and greater risk in profits as well, as
might be expected.  
V.  Wealth and the portfolio of crops
The structure of the model above suggests that if farmers are better able to smooth
consumption ex post in the face of a negative weather shock, they are more likely to choose a
riskier mix of crops.  Of course, the presence of perfect credit (or insurance) markets would be
one such means of ex post smoothing.  In the absence of perfect credit or insurance markets
however, wealthier households are likely to have greater ability for smoothing consumption ex
post, suggesting that wealthier households are likely to choose crops with higher average profits
as well as higher profit variance.  Such a finding has important implications for income
distribution.  If wealthier families earn higher average profits from crop production, then income13
inequality is likely to become greater over time. Moreover, as new crops (or HYV varieties) with
higher average profits and higher profit variance are introduced, the problem will worsen.
Figures 1 and 2  show the relationship between profit variance and total (real) assets for
Aurepalle and Kanzara.  The graphs suggest that there is a positive correlation between total
household wealth and the level of risk associated with the household’s crop mix.  To test this
result I regressed the household level measures of portfolio riskiness, +i, constructed using the
form in equation (7) and empirical estimates of {￿, /, ￿}, against the level of total household
wealth.  While total wealth holdings will not in general be independent of households preference
mappings for risk, implying that estimates of the effect of wealth on the riskiness of crop mix
would be potentially biased, the panel structure of the ICRISAT data allows me to sweep out any
differences that are fixed over time by the use of fixed effects estimators. 
The results reported in Table 6 suggest that indeed wealthier farmers choose mixes of
crops with higher degrees of riskiness, and higher average returns.  For Aurepalle, I reject a null
hypothesis of no farmer-specific fixed effects at the five percent level, suggesting that
heterogeneity in risk preferences present in the data would bias the random effects estimates. 
Household wealth explains nearly one-quarter of the overall variability in  +i in Aurepalle.  The
coefficient on total real wealth is positive and statistically significant at the five percent level,
while the square of wealth is negative (but significant at only the 20 percent level), indicating
some nonlinearity in the response of crop mix to wealth.  For Kanzara, I can reject the null of no
fixed effects at only the twenty percent level.  Nonetheless, I report the fixed effects estimates
since they are free from any bias arising from household differences in risk aversion.   Total real
household wealth explains only about a fourth of the variation in  +i in Kanzara.  The coefficient14
on total real wealth is positive, and statistically significant at the five percent level; the square of
total wealth is negative, but not statistically significant.
VI.  Conclusion
 I find that risk aversion may play an important role in determining crop choice in
Aurepalle and Kanzara.  There is a positive correlation between a crop’s effect on mean profits
and its effect on profit variance in both villages.   Likewise, I find that the variance in crop profits
is positively associated with higher levels of real wealth, indicating that the ability to smooth
consumption ex post leads farmers to choose a mix of crops with higher average profits,
exacerbating income and wealth inequality over time, especially with the introduction of riskier
HYVs.  A further direction for research is to determine the extent to which crop choice interacts
with labor and land market imperfections in the study villages.15
Table 1
Inequality in the ICRISAT Villages
Summary measure of the Distribution of Real Assets
1975 and 1983
=====================================================================
                                                               Aurepalle                                   Kanzara           
 
                                                  1975       1983                           1975       1983     
=====================================================================
Interquartile                             10784       17629                       17631      9312 
 Range
Gini Co-                                      0.51         0.59                           0.53      0.65   
coefficient
Ratio of 95
th percentile                49.1        61.1                           30.8      187.8  
to 5
th percentile




Cropping Patterns in ICRISAT Villages
By main crop (inter-cropping is not considered)
1975 and 1983
=====================================================================
                                                        Aurepalle                               Kanzara           
                                                   1975       1983                        1975       1983
=====================================================================
                             
Vegetables                                    .05         .01                                  .00          .02         
Pulses                                           .02          .03                                  .03         .06 
Traditional                                   .41           .24                                  .19          .11 
   Sorghum            
HYV Sorghum                                                                                   .07          .20 
Traditional 
   Paddy                                        .06           .02        
HYV Paddy                                 .11           .16        
Castor                                           .29          .05
HYV Castor                                     0         .38                             
Groundnuts                                                                                .10          .07
HYV Wheat                                                                               .03           .02
Traditional                                                                                 .51           .51
    Cotton
HYV Cotton                                                                              .02           .01 17
Table 3
Summary of Profit Regressions
Dependent Variable: Profits per acre
Pooled regressions, robust standard errors corrected for village clustering
                                                                Aurepalle                                 Kanzara 
                                                            (1)                                            (2)      
Share of irrigated land                        194.6                                      168.4 
(t-statistic)                                          (0.90)                                      (0.63) 
Total area farmed                               -1.15
                                         0.35
    
(t-statistic)                                         (-0.77)                                      (0.36)  
F-test for significance of                     7.61                                         3.16   
 rainfall variables                                (0.00)                                      (0.01)  
 (p-value)                                                                                                         
F- test for land share                            3.42                                        404.0 
 interaction terms (/ij)                         (0.00)                                      (0.00)
 (p-value)  
Hausman $
2test for                               13.5                                         21.7 
fixed effects                                        (1.00)                                       (1.00)
  (p-value)
N                                                           292                                           290 
    
R
2                                                          0.70                                         0.39
                             
*     indicates significance at the 10 percent level
* *    indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
* * *  indicates significance at the 1 percent level18
Table 4
Marginal Effects on expected profits and on profit variance in Aurepalle
(Relative to vegetable crops, evaluated at sample means)
                                         Sample Mean               0￿ / 0.i                           0+
2/0.i
Pulses                       .03                      -3.58                                 -1.95
Traditional Sorghum                .38                        2.18                                 -1.17
 
Traditional Paddy                     .03                       -3.18                                  0.09 
Improved Paddy                       .08                       10.70                                 3.60   
Traditional Castor                     .29                     -2.99                                  -0.97 
Improved Castor                       .12                      -2.01                                 -1.07 
Correlation coefficient                                         0.86 
between 0￿ / 0.i and 0+
2/0.i19
Table 5
Marginal Effects on expected profits and on profit variance in Kanzara
(Relative to vegetable crops, evaluated at sample means)
                                       Sample Mean               0￿ / 0.i                          0+
2/0.i
Pulses                      .05                        0.09                              0.10
Traditional Sorghum                .13                       -0.19                               0.13                       
Improved Sorghum                  .15                         0.46                               0.12
Improved Wheat                      .02                        -0.73                               0.20 
Traditional Cotton                   .57                          0.30                               0.12
Improved Cotton                      .01                         2.01                               0.54
Groundnuts                              .05                          0.26                              0.18
Correlation coefficient                                            0.60
between 0￿ / 0.i and 0+
2/0.i20
Table 6
Determinants of Crop Mix Riskiness ( +i )
Household fixed effects estimates
                                                      Aurepalle                Kanzara
                                                          (1)                          (2)                              
Household real wealth                  1.41
**                         0.68
**          
(X 10
-3)                                       (2.04)                         (2.10)            
Household real wealth                 -5.75                          -2.15                 
squared (X10
-9)                           (-1.31)                       (-0.71)          
Regression R-squared                  0.24                            0.28
Hausman test for                          6.68                            3.31      
fixed effects                                (0.04)                          (0.19)
(p-value)
t-statistics in parentheses
*     indicates significance at the 10 percent level
* *    indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
* * *  indicates significance at the 1 percent level21
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